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Dancing with the Smoke Monster
Employer Motivations for Negotiating 





Heads would spin on some of the old local managers who had 
spent years opposing the union. But there have been many con-
versions to the new philosophy. The horror of unionization wanes 
with the reality of it. It turns out to be a smoke monster, not a real 
monster.
 —Manager describing internal reaction to the negotiation of a   
 neutrality and card check agreement.
For decades the labor movement in the United States, along with 
many industrial relations and legal scholars, has argued that the union 
recognition procedures provided under national labor law do not suf-
ficiently protect workers’ rights to join, form, or assist unions. In par-
ticular, the requirement of an election, the procedures leading up to an 
election, and the timing of those procedures allow employers to un-
dertake extensive antiunion campaigns that at best undermine worker 
free choice and at worst violate the law. This was not always so. Under 
section 9(c) of the original National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the 
National Labor Relation Board (NLRB) was permitted to certify unions 
using “secret ballot elections or utiliz[ing] any other suitable method.” 
Until a board policy change in 1939, the method most often used was 
the simple process of evaluating cards signed by workers indicating 
they wanted the union to represent them. If a majority of the workforce 
signed such cards, the board certified the union. The Taft-Hartley Act 
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took away the board’s discretion as to the method used to verify major-
ity status. However, employers may still recognize a union voluntarily 
based on cards.
Referencing this earlier experience in the United States, the use of 
similar procedures in several Canadian provinces (Thomason 1994; 
Thomason and Pozzebon 1998), and the chilling effect of legal and il-
legal management resistance in this country, some proposals for com-
prehensive labor law reform call for a return to card check recognition 
procedures (for the most recent discussion see Godard [2003]). In the 
absence of this or any other reform, unions have increasingly negoti-
ated agreements directly with employers to use card check recognition 
procedures as well as to remain neutral on the subject of union organiz-
ing. In a recent study (Eaton and Kriesky 2001), we conclude that these 
types of agreements, particular those calling for card checks, substan-
tially reduce management campaigning—including illegal tactics such 
as firing union supporters—and produce much greater rates of union 
success. For example, across organizing campaigns under all types of 
organizing agreements, we estimate a union win rate of 67.7 percent 
compared to an NLRB election win rate of 45.6 percent over roughly 
the same time period.1 Thus, these agreements have the potential to en-
hance the exercise of workers’ rights to collective bargaining and free-
dom of association. 
This chapter serves as a follow-up to Eaton and Kriesky (2001). 
While the sources for that study were primarily interviews with union 
representatives and the review of contract language, this study focuses 
on management’s experience with these agreements. In interviews with 
representatives of 34 employing organizations, we explore the reasons 
management has agreed to negotiate neutrality and card check agree-
ments (N/CC), their impact on management campaigning, and reactions 
to N/CC from the employer’s own management team and the broader 
management community. We use these interviews to shed light on two 
overarching questions. Do these agreements actually encourage greater 
management respect for workers’ rights to freely decide whether or not 
they want union representation, or are employers who agree to N/CC 
softer in their opposition to unions to start with? To what extent is the 
source of managerial antiunionism economic and rational, as some of 
the literature suggested (Freeman and Kleiner 1990; Kleiner 2001), and 
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to what extent is it rooted in management values, ideology, and culture 
(Jacoby 1991) that deny workers’ rights?  
The chapter is organized as follows. We first provide a description 
of the sample of employers interviewed. Next we present a comprehen-
sive discussion of the reasons respondents gave for negotiating these 
agreements. This discussion follows the logic of earlier studies of em-
ployer opposition to union organizing, in assuming employers make 
cost/benefit analyses in deciding whether or not to accept N/CC lan-
guage. We follow with a section on the impact of these agreements on 
managerial campaigning. Next we look at reactions to the negotiation 
of these agreements from both the internal and external management 
communities. Finally, we conclude with an analysis of the broader 
meaning of these results for the nature of managerial antiunionism in 
the United States. 
SAMPLE AND METHODS
The sample was drawn from the same companies that were in our 
original survey (Eaton and Kriesky 2001).2 There was substantial at-
trition from our original list of about 130 agreements from various 
sources, including the merger or failure of companies and bad contact 
information.3 Elimination of these categories brought us down to 69 
organizations. Of these, 10 refused outright, 20 refused passively by 
failing to reply to our repeated attempts to contact them, and 5 told us 
they either never had or no longer had an organizing agreement, leav-
ing us with 34 interviews, some only partially done. This constitutes a 
response rate of about 50 percent. 
Based on our previous research, the industries represented in this 
employer-based study correspond fairly closely to the industries in 
which these agreements have been concentrated (see Table 9.1). The 
bulk of the interviews (19) were conducted with representatives from 
steel, hotel and gaming, telecommunications, and auto assembly and 
supply. Most respondents were high-level human resource or labor re-
lations executives, often at the vice president level. In some cases, we 
talked instead to lower-level, facility-based labor relations managers. 
Most often, the level of the manager interviewed was the individual 
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whose scope of responsibility included oversight or implementation 
of the organizing agreements within the organization. Interviews were 
conducted over the phone and lasted from 30 to 90 minutes. 
Table 9.2 presents data regarding unionization in the sample orga-
nizations. Research in the 1980s provided evidence that labor relations 
strategy, specifically union avoidance, was explained in part by union 
density: high density employers were less likely to pursue active avoid-
ance strategies (Cooke and Meyer 1990; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 
1986, p. 60). Thus, we would expect companies that have agreed to 
neutrality and card check to also have high union density. Indeed, our 
sample tilts toward heavily unionized companies dominated by a single 
union perceived to have a great deal of bargaining power. Still, almost 
a quarter of the companies have low union density (0–25 percent), in-
dicating that unions are pursuing neutrality and card check as both a 
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growth strategy (expanding into new employers and markets) and a de-
fensive strategy (maintaining representation among traditionally orga-
nized employers and businesses). 
Some observers have argued that it is important to look beyond gen-
eral density to concentration of union power, most often indicated by 
centralization of representation by a single union.4 Table 9.2 also in-
cludes data on the percentage of unionized workers represented by the 
single largest union. It is interesting to note that in the 14 cases where 
overall density is 50 percent or below, there is still a single dominant 




















Dominant union has a great deal of  
   bargaining power
Strongly agree or agree 22.0 68.8
Neutral 7.0 21.9
Strongly disagree or disagree 3.0 9.4
Table 9.2  Unionization Levels in the Sample Organizations
a This is the current percentage. But in most cases, the agreements have not led to 
major increases in density.
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union in all but two, suggesting that concentration of union representa-
tion may be a more important factor in winning organizing agreements 
than overall density. At the same time, the very low-density cases are 
also those with the weakest and most ineffective language.
Given union motivations for negotiating these agreements, we 
found it surprising (and not quite credible) that the majority of our re-
spondents claimed that unionization rates had been stable in their or-
ganizations at the time they first agreed to N/CC. Less surprising is the 
final result in Table 9.2: that employers consider the unions, to whom 
they have had to concede organizing agreements, to have a great deal of 
bargaining power. Interestingly, the most frequently mentioned sources 
of that bargaining power were the density of the union within the firm 
or organization and the union’s political connections.
NEGOTIATIONS
It is difficult to quantify the motivations for bargaining organiz-
ing agreements. Relying on existing industrial relations literature, we 
use a cost/benefit framework to organize the issues employers reported 
considering in deciding whether to agree to some form of organizing 
language.5 We extend the cost side of the discussion by using a con-
ventional framework for analyzing bargaining power, which weighs 
the projected cost of not agreeing to an opponent’s proposal against 
the projected cost of agreeing to that proposal. Although in each case, 
the parties weigh their particular cost and benefit estimates in deciding 
whether to enter into a neutrality agreement, below we summarize the 
sample as a whole on the benefits and two types of costs. The specific 
costs and benefits reported are listed in Table 9.3. 
Benefits of Agreeing
The majority of respondents emphasized that in negotiating orga-
nizing agreements, they were attempting to avoid costs. However, a 
significant minority emphasized instead the benefits of agreeing. Most 
of the benefits anticipated focus on the value that unions can add to the 
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business or to a particular business strategy. There were several differ-
ent specific examples of unions adding value. 
In two cases, respondents emphasized union–management partner-
ship as their dominant strategic goal in negotiating organizing agree-
ments. In both, these employers had decided to pursue business strate-
gies that were tied to embracing a strong role for unions and employees 
in management decision making. To establish such significant partner-
ing required recognizing the union’s legitimate interest in representing 
workers’ rights in the workplace and in their own institutional survival 
and growth. Other employers engaged in partnerships, particularly those 
involving the United Steelworkers of America, also talked about part-
nership, formal or informal, and union willingness to negotiate more 
flexible agreements. This includes the recognition in new bargaining 
Table 9.3 Employer Objectives in Negotiating Organizing Agreements
Benefits of agreeing
Union willing to add value to the business
Labor–management partnership 
Assistance in increased funding for nonprofits
Assistance in obtaining qualified, skilled labor
Assistance in attracting business/customers
Maintenance of good relations with workforce
Ability to shape organizing campaigns 
Costs of not agreeing
Work stoppage (18)
Loss of specific, needed concessions
Organizational picketing





Increased wages and benefits (13)
Decreased attractiveness as takeover/merger target
Loss of flexibility
Loss of employee rights
Loss of cooperative, nontraditional work culture
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agreements that new business lines might not be able to support the 
same wage levels or work rules as in the traditional businesses. Specific 
examples of this union response are detailed in the section on costs of 
agreeing.
One company, an auto parts supplier, observed that the UAW had 
become a force in sourcing decisions for the Big Three and was advo-
cating for increasing business with unionized suppliers. Thus, welcom-
ing unionization could secure or expand customers. A group of Mas-
sachusetts residential care facilities were motivated to reach organizing 
agreements by the potential for the union involved, SEIU, to extract 
increased funding from the legislature: “Anybody who could help bring 
more money, better working conditions, more respect, we were willing 
to accommodate their needs.”6 These employers also hoped to be able 
to establish a constructive, nontraditional relationship with the union 
once organized. In yet another set of cases, the value added by the union 
was in supplying qualified, skilled labor. Representatives of casinos in 
one of the large, unionized markets reported (as did the union repre-
sentatives in the earlier study) that when the casinos originally opened, 
they were desperate for skilled labor. The unions (Hotel Employees 
and Restaurant Employees International Union and the building trades) 
could supply that labor. Further, the unions continue to add value to the 
industry in this way today, which is one reason the language endures. 
In some interviews, managers reported that the give and take of 
bargaining over organizing language provided an opportunity to reach a 
specific, high priority management bargaining goal in negotiations with 
currently organized workplaces. The specific issues mentioned in these 
cases included restrictions on subcontracting, the length of the contract, 
wage reductions, and other concessions to cope with bankruptcy.
Beyond adding value to the business, employers realized addi-
tional benefits through the bargaining over the details of the organizing 
agreement itself. This bargaining offers management the opportunity to 
shape how organizing is conducted. This was especially important to 
employers who believed organizing was going to take place whether or 
not there was language addressing it. As one employer put it:
Other companies may be dealing with unions that aren’t factual 
and therefore feel the need to be able to respond factually. But this 
kind of problem can be handled in the language. For instance, if 
you think home visits are coercive, use the neutrality agreement to 
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ban them. Employers need to realize they can shape the campaign 
through the give and take in negotiating these agreements.
Costs of Not Agreeing
As described earlier, our analysis of costs incorporates two elements 
relevant to the bargaining environment in which neutrality and card 
check is established. These are the costs of not agreeing to the language 
and the cost of agreeing. They are evaluated in turn below. Despite the 
fact that most aspects of neutrality and card check have been typically 
understood to be permissive subjects of bargaining and the strike has 
been widely viewed as waning in power, the principal projected cost 
of not agreeing for more than half (18) of our respondents was an an-
ticipated work stoppage. Though in most cases, the threat sufficed. One 
large and well-known telecommunications employer took and lost a 
strike widely reported to have hinged in substantial part on this issue.7 
Respondents cited other projected costs of not agreeing aside from 
work stoppages.8 In one case, a partially organized chain of stores 
agreed to neutrality language to avoid picketing that would potentially 
damage their business. In other cases, the union used action(s) of a third 
party to impose (or threaten to impose) costs on the employer. These 
third parties included a primary employer’s clients, municipalities pro-
viding financial support to a business, union pension funds (a potential 
source of investment), or religious and other community groups. These 
third parties imposed costs by either withholding investment dollars or 
withholding business as customers. 
Campaigns involving multiple pressure points to move employers 
to agree to neutrality and card check are not always successful. Indeed, 
one company reported that it always carefully weighs the business case 
for opening an operation in a particular market against union or in-
vestor pressure when responding to a demand for N/CC. Another re-
spondent successfully resisted union pressures involving “politicians, 
negative PR, and sit-ins at referral agencies.”9 The evidence presented 
here makes clear that, contrary allegations notwithstanding, employ-
ers do have choices to make about organizing agreements, and that the 
decision to agree to organizing language is often, at root, a business 
decision, with employer concerns about workers’ rights playing at best, 
a secondary role.10  
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Costs of Agreeing
Twenty-eight respondents supplied information about their per-
ceived costs of agreeing to some type of organizing language. Of these, 
a significant majority (20) projected some additional costs, although 
about a third of these (7) thought the costs would be low. 
The respondents reporting either no costs (6) or low costs (7) can 
be lumped together for analytical purposes. A significant portion of 
this group had low-cost expectations because they expected either no, 
or a very low level of, organizing. For some, most covered workers 
were already organized and the company was either not planning to 
expand or was actually downsizing. As one put it, “If we get to the 
point of opening new facilities, that will mean we have succeeded and 
that will be great.” Others simply expected little successful organiz-
ing, in some cases because they had negotiated weak language. Others 
expected costs to be low because of their good relationship with the 
union and the union’s flexibility. One manufacturer in this category is 
involved in an extensive union–management partnership, including a 
joint effort to redesign work and provide a more rapid response time 
to customers, therefore presumably increasing market share. Thus, any 
increases in wages and benefits would be offset by reduced production 
costs and increased sales. Several respondents in this category indicated 
that the union was willing to reach “an innovative, lower-cost agree-
ment” in new facilities. One final employer in this group expected the 
union to organize successfully and labor costs to increase. However, 
they also expected that many, if not most or even all, of their competi-
tors would also be organized so that there would be little competitive 
consequence.11 
The largest single group (13) stated that they did expect success-
ful organizing and therefore increased labor costs. A few companies 
within this group indicated that, as stated earlier, because the union had 
shown a willingness to negotiate “nontraditional,” flexible labor con-
tracts, at least some of the wage and benefit increases were offset by 
looser work rules. Two respondents identified costs related to mergers 
or takeovers. A couple of respondents reported that the neutrality and 
card check agreement made the company a less attractive merger or 
takeover target. 
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It is important to note that many respondents weighed differently 
the costs of including “core” or “strategic” occupations within the N/
CC agreement from those with newer, more competitive business lines. 
In these cases, the potential costs of agreeing were seen as outweighing 
the costs of not agreeing.12 Respondents reported that they either would 
resist or had actually resisted coverage of these employees. These in-
clude, in particular, salaried workforces, especially in manufacturing 
companies, and gaming occupations (dealers, slot attendants, etc.) in 
gaming establishments. As one employer put it, “Neutrality and card 
check covers traditional union occupations, not [occupations labeled 
as management]. [We] are definitely not neutral about whether these 
should be union. This seems to be an irritant to the union, but they are 
not pushing hard to change it.”
For other employers, the issue is the competitiveness of particu-
lar lines of business. For instance, large, diversifying manufacturing 
companies need to protect new lines of business from what they per-
ceive to be noncompetitive labor costs and work rules: “[Union] wages 
would kill [our noncore/nontraditional] businesses.” But, as discussed 
earlier, other companies have successfully sought the union’s recogni-
tion that some lines of business need sheltering and have thus been able 
to agree to more comprehensive coverage: “The union has been willing 
to reach nontraditional types of contracts . . . If you’re honest, you as-
sume unionization is going to make for higher costs. But this doesn’t 
necessarily have to be true. [Nontraditional business unit] managers are 
happy with their contracts.”
Although most respondents defined costs in financial and economic 
terms, two suggested difficult-to-quantify costs. One hospitality em-
ployer suggested a cost was in “giving up employee rights [under fed-
eral labor law].” A nonprofit human service agency feared the loss of a 
cooperative, nontraditional work culture.
In sum, then, although some employers did see the potential for 
higher labor costs resulting from these agreements, that view was cer-
tainly not universal. Some saw these costs offset by some benefit. Oth-
ers simply found that these costs of agreeing were less than the costs 
of not agreeing. Finally, with rare exceptions, management did not per-
ceive these agreements as jeopardizing workers’ rights. In the cases in 
which respondents implied that these rights were an issue, it was re-
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flected in concern for the crafting and enforcement of language, rather 
than whether or not language would exist. 
Indeed, although our respondents emphasized the cost/benefit rea-
soning for their decision, several respondents also mentioned what 
might be called a consistency argument for neutrality. Many employers, 
particularly those working in partnership with a union, found it difficult 
to argue with this logic: “[The union] said, ‘How can you talk out of 
both sides of your mouth at once?’ The [nonunion property] is literally 
attached by a tunnel—joined at the hip with a union property and it just 
didn’t make sense.” In short, some managers agreed to neutrality or 
card check to be consistent in their approach to their relationship with 
the union. 
IMPACT ON MANAGEMENT’S BEHAVIOR IN CAMPAIGNS
We looked at the impact of N/CC agreements on employers in two 
ways. We asked about 1) management campaign behavior before and 
after the agreement, and 2) management behavior in organizing cam-
paigns covered by the agreement versus campaigns among work groups 
not covered by the agreement. Overall, employers found these ques-
tions odd and were surprised that anyone would think that the agree-
ments don’t make a difference.13 
Twenty-six respondents answered the question about whether there 
had been organizing before the agreement. Only 4 said there had not 
been. Of the 22 indicating there had been organizing, 17 (81 percent) 
said that they responded differently after the agreement than before. 
Some employers just indicated that they used to respond “traditionally” 
and now do not. Others were more specific. One employer said, “Prior 
to the organizing agreement, we had a design called ‘Fully Informed 
Employee Choice.’ We presented pros and cons of unionization. Man-
agers were free to express opinions either way. Now—full neutrality.” 
Another responded, “Now we’re limited. Before we showed videotapes, 
had meetings, hired consultants. Now we do none of these.”
Several employers indicated that they did use a softer approach to 
organizing prior to the agreement, but that that approach had been fur-
ther toned down by the organizing agreement. One employer respond-
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ed, “We never ran a Southern-style campaign, with real mud-slinging, 
‘[The] Union’s going to come into town in Cadillacs, steal your money 
and your women’ kind of campaign . . . After [the agreement] we are 
much more careful.” Three respondents indicated that their response to 
organizing had not changed.14 
Twenty-nine respondents answered our question about coverage of 
the agreement, all but one indicating that there are union-eligible em-
ployees who are not covered. Of these, only 17 answered the question 
about whether or not the response to organizing is different for cov-
ered employees than noncovered. (Many could not answer this question 
because there had been no organizing among noncovered employees.) 
Here again, the majority (88 percent) of those answering indicated that 
they respond to organizing by covered employees differently than non-
covered: 
[For noncovered employees, we run t]raditional campaigns—lim-
ited access to associates, we communicate much more: the com-
pany is the point of information. In [neutrality/card check] cam-
paigns, we give the union access, allow the union to be the visible 
point of information. The company remains in the shadows.
[For noncovered employees, we run] very typical [campaigns]—6 
weeks of communications so that employees can make informed 
decisions. We hire consultants, run full tilt campaigns, the works.
However, some indicated that there is a kind of spill-over from the 
organizing agreement even to those not covered and that the campaigns 
they ran were not as intense as they would otherwise have been:
The [union] made a play for salaried workers in one plant. We 
were a little more aggressive, but still high road. There was a dif-
ference in what we could say . . . with this group, we could say we 
preferred to remain nonunion.
While we cannot conclude from these results that these companies 
were not “soft” campaigners to start with, we can say that the agreement 
has changed, specifically softened or even eliminated their campaign 
behavior. Some respondents clearly viewed themselves as soft cam-
paigners, but it is not clear that unions perceive these same employers 
as “soft” in their tactics. 
An additional indicator of the impact on management behavior is 
management’s desire to change the language. The respondents split al-
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most evenly on this question. Twelve individuals thought their language 
either worked well or had been in place so long that it would cause more 
trouble to change than to retain. 
Among the 13 managers who indicated that they wanted to change 
the language, a second notable division occurred. About half of this 
group suggested specific revisions, including more employer latitude to 
talk to employees and more controls on the union’s behavior, especially 
home visits. The other (approximately) half of this group stated clearly 
that, although it was not currently possible, they would like to be rid of 
the neutrality or card check language. 
This result is further supported by data recorded on a more hypo-
thetical question. Near the end of the survey, we asked participants, 
“Recognizing that you might prefer to pursue both options . . . if your 
company was forced to choose, would it prefer to keep as much of the 
company nonunion as possible, or build a cooperative relationship with 
existing unions?” Fifty-five percent answering the question indicated 
that preserving nonunion status where possible was preferable. This 
level of resistance is remarkable. 
REACTIONS IN THE MANAGEMENT COMMUNITY
Initial Internal Management Reaction
It was not surprising that a strong majority (75 percent) of the re-
spondents answering these questions described strong opposition with-
in the managerial hierarchy. Some respondents talked about general 
dissatisfaction within management ranks, citing no specific pockets of 
opposition: 
But most managers think [neutrality and card check] is foolish. 
They are still thinking in the old model—that the union is an ob-
stacle rather than in the new model where the unions can help them 
manage and meet their goals.
The majority were opposed but as long as the CEO was for it, no 
one was going to say anything.
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In a handful of cases, virtually everyone appeared to oppose the 
language:
We were pariahs—we’d failed. Nobody thought it was worthwhile. 
There were no supporters within management.
But in many cases, particular management types stood out in their 
opposition. The largest single group mentioned was managers of newly 
developed and/or nonunion businesses within larger diversified organi-
zations. In some cases, these managers were used to operating in largely 
or entirely nonunion companies that had been purchased or merged into 
more unionized companies: 
There are deep cultural and philosophical differences. [The merged 
company] was largely nonunion and managers from that world 
don’t understand. 
Some junior department heads—say, 25 percent—couldn’t accept 
it. They came from down the street [in nonunion businesses] and 
just didn’t understand the give and take in the union environment 
and why this was the right thing to do. They were philosophically 
opposed.
Less commonly mentioned were particular functional groups within 
management. Some respondents specifically mentioned that their law-
yers, either internal or external counsel, were opposed to language that 
the company was willing to accept, a phenomenon that raises questions 
about the role of lawyers in labor relations strategy: 
The lawyers were outraged—said it was stupid. 
Management Compliance
In our earlier study (Eaton and Kriesky 2001), union representa-
tives reported that many of the problems relating to employer compli-
ance with neutrality and card check agreements occurred in large, cen-
tralized bargaining relationships. In these relationships, unions often 
complained that lower-level managers, for a variety of reasons, did not 
adhere to the organizing agreement. Thus, we asked our management 
respondents about whether they “encountered obstacles in getting local 
managers to comply,” and if so, what they did about it.
The sample was evenly divided on this question, with 11 reporting 
problems and 12 reporting no problems or only minor ones.15 Some of 
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those reporting problems have found some lower-level managers to be 
a major headache:  
I’ve had some knock-down, drag-out fights. ‘What do you mean I 
can’t do x!??!’ . . . They also fight over control [of the campaign].
As with the initial reactions described above, compliance was most 
difficult for managers habituated to a nonunion environment:
It’s been very, very tedious in one area that has been entirely non-
union.
Regardless of the compliance problems encountered, the means of 
ensuring ultimate compliance were similar. Some managers focus on 
education to secure compliance:
[We have] a certain amount of complaints with noncompliance 
with the design. [We respond] with education—so the problems 
are more from misunderstanding than real resistance. Education is 
the best remedy.
Local managers want advice on how to do it. They don’t want to 
screw up. They look to HR and legal to explain it, define the mean-
ing. They’re not happy, but they want to do it right.
At times, pointed messages about the organizational consequences 
have been necessary. Some companies have resorted to either the threat 
of or actual individual consequences in the form of discipline:16 
The owners were very serious and managers were under threat of 
losing their jobs . . . [T]he company hired private investigators to 
investigate [union] charges and actually transferred or put manag-
ers on leave.
Some thought they could say publicly, ‘Yes sir!’ but continue op-
position . . . People got in trouble. The message was clear.
Maybe 25 percent of lower-level managers couldn’t ever accept 
[it], couldn’t catch on and had to leave.
There would not be [obstacles from local managers], because we 
take this very, very seriously. No ifs, ands, or buts . . . For local 
managers, the stakes are very high if they don’t comply.
Freeman and Kleiner (1990) present evidence that union opposition 
is rational at the level of the individual manager—managerial careers 
often suffer following a successful union organizing drive. As the above 
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comments suggest, the environment in some organizations had changed 
with neutrality/card check such that managerial careers will suffer from 
failure to abide by the organizing agreement. This appears to be a cru-
cial aspect of the implementation of these agreements from the per-
spective of union activists who argue that workers are afraid to support 
unionization because of management reprisals for doing so. 
Reactions in External Management Community
To determine how employers willing to engage in neutrality or card 
check were viewed by their business colleagues, we asked: “To the 
best of your knowledge, has the company been criticized within the 
management community for signing this agreement?” If necessary, we 
prompted respondents to think in terms of their particular industry or 
geographical region. Although a handful couldn’t answer the question, 
most did answer. Among those who answered, a majority (about 60 per-
cent) said they had not been criticized. Most of these respondents came 
either from industries like steel or telecommunications, where some 
form of organizing agreement has become common practice, or where 
operations are located in metropolitan areas that are heavily unionized. 
As one put it, “This is standard practice in the industry.”
Still, in these industries, the employers who had agreed to the lan-
guage most favorable to the union came under fire:
Yes, within [our] industry. I hear that [the union] throws [our agree-
ment] in other company’s faces regularly. So, I do hear [criticism] 
in the [industry] labor relations community.
When there was criticism, it is typically from within the industry: 
Yes, the [industry] community feels very threatened. They don’t 
necessarily agree [with our strategy]. Traditionalists are saying, 
‘Oh, my God. What would happen to me, to [the industry] if we 
lose control?’
To some extent, within [the] industry, but we get criticized for a lot 
of stuff . . . In certain cities, if the facility becomes union, similar 
facilities locally would criticize the local management.
Indicative of the strong antiunion sentiments permeating employer 
circles across the country, some respondents experienced criticism in 
either industry-based or locally based social relationships:  
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I’d walk into a room and get the cold shoulder.
I’ve been called a Communist.
The local management will hear it from other managers at local 
business group meetings.
At the local level, within local business communities, we have 
definitely been criticized, called a cancer. We have ‘abandoned’ 
everyone else. This doesn’t come from within the . . . industry. It 
is local.
Some respondents suggested the pressure is especially intense in 
the South:
Yes, particularly within some communities. For instance, with one 
acquisition in South Carolina, [we heard, ‘You] are welcome but 
please don’t bring the union along with you.’
This is the South and there have been a lot of threats of customers 
to pull out [business] if the union wins, which is a real concern.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
There is clear evidence from these interviews that most organiz-
ing agreements make a difference in employer campaign behavior. Em-
ployers themselves report that their campaign behavior changes in the 
face of these agreements, even in some cases in the face of weak agree-
ments. Although it remains possible that these employers were not the 
most aggressive antiunion campaigners to start with, these agreements 
are still having an effect on their conduct. As such, these interviews pro-
vide further evidence that these agreements serve to enhance workers 
rights to free choice and to engage in collective bargaining.
The interviews also make clear, however, that employers remain 
extremely reluctant to engage in these agreements. This finding is clear-
ly consistent with the emerging legislative efforts by the HR Policy As-
sociation (formerly the Labor Policy Association) and others to prohibit 
card check recognition (see Eaton and Kriesky 2003). Further, these 
agreements represent a privatization of rights and rights enforcement. 
The enhancement of rights through these agreements comes about 
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through union bargaining power. The use of power to enforce the right 
to unionization and collective bargaining is precisely what the Wag-
ner Act sought to avoid. Thus, while N/CC agreements expand worker 
rights, they cannot ultimately substitute for comprehensive labor law 
reform. 
Beyond these observations, the interviews also tell us something 
about employer antiunionism, perhaps the single most important factor 
undermining workers rights to collective action in the United States. 
We see considerable evidence for the Freeman and Kleiner (1990) view 
that the employer decision to oppose unionization (or in this case, not 
to oppose it) is rooted in economic rationality. In their terms, union 
campaigns to win organizing language have focused both on increasing 
the cost of opposition and, at least in several cases, decreasing the cost 
of unionization, the costs involved with organizing itself, or other costs. 
Further, employers clearly had their eyes on their competitors when 
deciding what to do about N/CC; employers in industries where the 
negotiation of organizing agreements has become commonplace were 
less concerned about the consequences and reported less of a negative 
reaction. 
There is evidence for motivations beyond economic rationality, 
however. In particular, the strong opposition to the extension of N/CC 
to and unionization of salaried and other strategically located occupa-
tional groups appears to result from a desire to maintain managerial con-
trol. Of course, most respondents recognized that a significant source 
of union bargaining power is the union’s density within the firm. Many 
further worried that agreeing to N/CC would increase the union’s den-
sity. This increase in union power and control could ultimately translate 
into higher costs as well.
Finally, we close by noting that there are also indicators of the irra-
tional or cultural/ideological component of the decision as well (Jacoby 
1991), revealed through our interview process. For instance, there is 
evidence that some managers cling to their antiunionism past the point 
when it is rational for their career with a particular employer. Further, 
there is often a strong negative reaction in the external management 
community and among external counsel. While Freeman and Kleiner 
argue that it is economic rationality that sends employers to antiunion 
consultants and law firms, it appears to us that those consultants and 
law firms may themselves not always be acting in the employer’s eco-
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nomic interest—recommending opposition to unionization even when 
the employer has concluded that there are sound business reasons not 
to do so. This suggests that further research into the balance between 
rational economic choices and power relations and ideology is in order 
to fully understand the decision-making process about union opposition 
in general and neutrality and card check agreements in particular.
Notes
 1.  See Eaton and Kriesky (2001) for a full explanation of the comparability of these 
statistics.
 2.  That original sample was assembled from a variety of sources. We developed 
the initial list through a short survey sent to representatives of all U.S. unions 
with over 100,000 members; the survey asked respondents about the types of 
organizing agreements they had negotiated. We added to this group agreements 
identified by a review of legal and popular business publications. Finally, when 
we conducted more thorough interviews with union representatives about each 
agreement, we asked them to identify additional agreements that they were aware 
of, a process known as snowball sampling. For more information, see Eaton and 
Kriesky (2001).
 3.  We also did not attempt to contact employers for whom we had not been able to 
obtain contract language, who were very small, or who the union asked us not to 
contact. The sample size was further reduced by the merger of multiple agree-
ments into a single entity. We were unable to find contact information for the 
handful of multiemployer associations in the original sample. We were able to 
do an interview with a representative from a multiemployer association that was 
not in the original database. That interview is not included in the results reported 
here.
 4.  Indeed, this argument is at the center of SEIU’s current proposals for reorganiz-
ing and rationalizing the labor movement.
 5.  We emphasize that we recount here what managers told us about the bargaining 
process. While these reports are no doubt filtered through the lenses of the re-
spondents, there are few, if any, major differences in the stories told by manager 
and union respondents about the same case. If anything, managers may have 
emphasized union bargaining power to a greater extent than the union represen-
tatives did. 
  6.  For a published account of these negotiations, see Green (1997).
  7.  In another case, an employer was motivated by a union’s prolonged and ulti-
mately successful campaign to win neutrality and card check from a nonunion 
competitor: “We all saw [our competitor] go through a long, expensive battle to 
remain nonunion and then succumb.”
  8.  Given that the dynamics of bargaining are complicated and multifaceted, some 
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of the strike threat cases referred to above also involved these other forms of 
pressure. 
  9.  This case remains in the sample because the end result was extremely weak 
language about organizing—so weak that, until recently, the union chose not to 
attempt organizing at this employer. Unions who obtain very weak language do 
so for a variety of reasons, including saving face with members and observers 
and the possibility that the language will serve as a “foot in the door” and can 
later be improved upon.
10.  For an example of the argument that management is so bullied that it abrogates 
its responsibility to protect workers’ rights, see Yager, Bartl, and LoBue (1998).
11.  It is interesting to note that this mass organizing did not come to pass: “The own-
ers had thought the whole industry would fall . . . Instead, there has been no other 
successful organizing.”  
12.  Sometimes explicit but often implicit in these discussions was the belief that 
the union was unwilling to push hard by imposing costs to cover nontraditional 
employee groups. 
13.  This reaction is consistent with anecdotal evidence that the same multinational 
employer will deal differently with unions in different countries, suggesting that 
at least part of the difference is conditioned by different regulatory regimes.
14.  Two of these involved a neutrality-only agreement with a weak definition of 
neutrality and claim that the agreement has made no difference in how they re-
spond to organizing. The other was a successor employer who indicated that their 
response thus far had been to deny coverage of the agreement but even if that 
failed they would still not change their negative approach. 
15.  This is the one substantial difference in the overlapping findings from the origi-
nal union study and the employer study. 
16.  In one case, an organizing agreement that called for neutrality and non-NLRB 
elections provided for arbitration if the union alleged a pattern of noncompliance. 
If the union won the arbitration, the agreement called for card check as a blanket 
remedy. Our respondent told us that local managers were asked “if they really 
wanted to shoulder the responsibility for provoking a card check imposition on 
the whole corporation?” This was quite effective in modifying their behavior. 
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